Energy Transition Security - ORIGINAL CONTENT
- By:
- Edward A. Reid Jr.
- Posted On:
- Dec 3, 2024 at 6:00 AM
- Category
- Energy Policy, Climate Change
Energy security is critical for advanced societies. The most secure energy system relies on diverse domestic resources and infrastructure with a comfortable margin of safety under peak demand conditions. This is the type of energy system the US and many developed nations had prior to the adoption of Net Zero by 2050 as a “global” goal. That “global” goal, currently pursued almost exclusively by the developed nations, is driving an energy transition away from a domestic fossil fuel-based energy system and toward an energy system based on intermittent renewable generation and storage. This energy system is more susceptible to cyberattacks from unfriendly nations as well as to operation interruptions and physical damage from unfriendly weather.
The US DOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy has been concerned regarding cyberattacks on wind energy generation systems for more than a decade. DOE has documented eight incidents over the past ten years which have disrupted wind energy systems. The Idaho National Laboratory report, “Attack Surface of Wind Energy Technologies in the United States” evaluates both cyberattack and weather event risks to wind generation. The growing remote monitoring of wind facilities potentially increases their exposure to cyberattacks, particularly if components of the wind turbines have been sourced from unfriendly nations.
There has been relatively limited concern regarding solar arrays until recently. However, a “white hat” Dutch hacker recently demonstrated that large solar arrays are vulnerable to remote cyberattacks, again largely resulting from the systems put in place to monitor their performance.
A combined cyberattack on wind and solar generation facilities on a peak day could endanger lives and wreak havoc with the energy system in the affected nation(s). This is of particular concern regarding solar PV collectors produced in China and solar and wind infrastructure using components, including semiconductor chips, made in China.
Concerns about cybersecurity risks have recently been heightened as the result of an Israeli military campaign which apparently remotely triggered explosions of pagers, walkie talkies and cell phones used by Hezbollah militants. Similar actions against wind and solar infrastructure, either using explosives or “kill switches” embedded in semiconductors could permanently disable, rather than just interfere with, vital energy system infrastructure. EV batteries and grid scale storage systems are also susceptible to interference or damage from such attacks.
The US military bans the purchase and use of any systems or components containing microchips manufactured in China as the first line of defense against hostile interference in military operations, particularly since China might well constitute the “enemy” in future military operations.
It is critical that the US and other nations proceeding on an energy system transition to intermittent renewable generation, battery-based storage systems and battery-based transportation, particularly if based largely on components and systems sourced from unfriendly nations, harden their energy system infrastructure against cyberattacks.
It is also critical that these nations reassess the risks to that more physically fragile infrastructure associated with weather events, such as hailstorms, snow and freezing rain, tornadoes and hurricanes which have demonstrated the ability to severely damage or destroy solar arrays and wind turbines.